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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN LEASE
OF FURNISHED PREMISES FOR SHORT TERM:
EROSION OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
At common law, the rule of caveat emptor applied to a lease of real
property.1 Therefore, it was the tenant's duty to inspect the premises
before leasing them to determine their safety and adaptibility to his
needs.2 With the rare exceptions of fraud, misrepresentation or express
warranty, the landlord was not liable to a tenant who was injured by
defects in the premises.3 Under no circumstances was there an implied
warranty in the lease of real property that the premises were suitable
for occupancy. 4 Today, the great weight of authority, in the absence
of statute, is in accord with the common law.5 Simply stated, the ma-
jority rule is that there is no implied warranty of habitability in a lease-
hold estate, unless such a warranty can be inferred from the terms of
the written lease.6 The primary exception to the majority rule appears
in the lease of furnished premises for a short term.
The earliest case involving this exception was the English decision
of Snith v. Mavrable,7 decided in 1843. There, a tenant who had leased
1 Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496 (1910); Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C.
407, 100 S.E. 583 (1919); Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889); Oliver
v. Cashier, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 56 S.E.2d
637 (1949); Powell v. Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927); Charlow v. Blanken-
ship, 80 W.Va. 200, 92 S.E. 318 (1917).
2 Turner v. Ragan, 229 S.W. 809 (Mo. 1921); Roberts v. Rogers, 129 Neb. 298, 261
N.W. 354 (1935); Duffy v. Hurtsfield, 180 N.C. 151, 104 S.E. 139 (1920); Franklin v.
Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 858 (1889); Clifton v. Montague, 40 W.Va. 207, 21 S.E.
858 (1895).
3 Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 211, 56 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1949).
4 Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo. 583, 19 P. 652 (1888); Boyer v. Commercial Bldg.
Invest. Co., 110 Iowa 491, 81 N.W. 720 (1900); Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A.
26 (1922).
5 Valin v. Jewell, 88 Conn. 151, 90 A. 36 (1914); Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 56
S.E.2d 80 (1949); Stewart v. Raleigh County Bank, 121 W.Va. 181, 2 S.E.2d 274 (1939).
See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reformn, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1279, 1285 (1960); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
6 Other exceptions include those cases where the lessee, restricted to a particular use,
accepts the lease before the premises are completely constructed or altered. See Wool-
ford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App.2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938); J.D. Young
Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.VWr.2d 460 (Tex. 1930); Hardman v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111
P. 1059 (1910).
7 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
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a furnished house at a resort area was allowed to abandon the demised
premises upon discovering that they were infested with vermin. In two
later cases decided the same year, the holding in Smith v. Marrable was
adopted, but it was criticized and strictly limited to a lease of furnished
premises for a short term.8 The significance of each of these early cases
is that the tenant invoked the implied warranty concept as a defense to
the landlord's action for rent. In effect, implied warranty was used as a
type of constructive eviction to erode the caveat emptor rule.a What
these cases did not allow, however, was the complete abrogation of caveat
emptor by permitting the tenant to recover for personal injuries.
Hacker v. Nitschke
In 1892, Massachusetts adopted the English exception in what was
to be the first of a series of cases involving the application of implied
warranty to leases of realty.9 Some fifty years later in Hacker v.
Nitschke,"0 the Massachusetts court extended the implied warranty con-
cept to allow a tenant, who had leased a furnished beach cottage for four
weeks, to recover when injured as a result of a defect in a bunk-bed
ladder." Even though the landlord had no knowledge of the concealed >/".
defect and had not been negligent in failing to discover its presence, he
was held liable for the injuries to the tenant. The court based its de-
cision on the breach of an implied agreement that the ladder, as part of
the furnishings, was safe for use.
The Hacker decision was unique because it allowed the tenant to use
the implied warranty of habitability concept as an affirmative weapon
8 Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843); Hart v. Windsor, 152 Eng. Rep.
1114 (Ex. 1843). It was approved and followed in 1877 by Wilson v. Finch Hutton,
L.R. 2 Ex. 336 (1877). The latter case may be distinguished on its facts, however.
SaBuckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806, 221 Cal. App. 2d 1013 (1967).
9 Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). The adoption of the implied
warranty theory where furnished premises are leased for a short period has been
justified on three grounds:
A. The parties contemplate immediate occupation without the necessity of al-
teration;
B. A furnished dwelling is difficult to inspect before renting;
C. The exception, in line with modern business practices, is just and equitable.
Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MicH. L. REv. 260, 281-82 (1928).
10 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E. 2d 644 (1942).
"1 Screws holding clamps by which the ladder was attached to the upper bunk
became loose. While the tenant was climbing the ladder, the screws pulled out causing
the clamps to become detached. The tenant was injured when the ladder fell.
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against the landlord.12 The rationale behind the court's decision was
that the tenant, in leasing furnished premises for a short term, had no
time to inspect.13 The Massachusetts court stated that since the lease-
hold was to be let furnished under a short term lease, the parties con-
templated that the dwelling would be ready for immediate occupancy
without any necessity of alteration. Under these circumstances, the
tenant would rely on the landlord to see that the premises were in a
habitable condition at the commencement of his tenancy. As such, no
inspection would be necessary, nor in fact contemplated. The ultimate
effect of Hacker v. Nitschke was to relieve a tenant of his common law
duty to inspect furnished premises leased for a short term.
Prior to the Hacker decision the Massachusetts court had been at-
tacked for its abrogation of the common law duty of inspection. 14 The
essence of the attack was that there was no more difficulty in inspecting
furnished than unfurnished premises,' 5 and that to justify an implied war-
ranty of habitability on the grounds that no inspection by the tenant
was contemplated, was somewhat artificial.' Further attacks on the
language used in the Hacker decision followed.' 7 No one was sure,
exactly, for how long a "short term" lease ran. When faced with this
problem of terminology, the Maine court adopted the phrase "for a
temporary purpose" rather than "short term." '8
Through judicial interpretation, the holding in Hacker was gradually
defined by the Massachusetts court. Subsequent cases limited the rule
to defects existing at the time the premises were let,19 provided the
12 Prior to this case, the implied warranty doctrine was successfully used by the
tenant only as a shield against an action by the landlord for rent.
13 Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E. 2d 644 (1942).
14 Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MicH. L. REv. 260, 282 (1928); Note,
37 HARv. L. REv. 896, 898 (1942).
15 Davis v. George, 67 N.H. 393, 396, 39 A. 979, 981 (1892); Harkrider, supra note
14, at 282.
16 Harkrider, supra note 14, at 282.
17Note, 37 HARv. L. REv. 896, 898 (1942); 90 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (1942).
18 Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 143, 116 A. 26, 27 (1922). The court stated that
"for a temporary purpose," being a more elastic phrase, would admit testimony not
only as to the length of the leasehold estate, but also as to other circumstances surrounding
the lease agreement, such as the purposes for which the premises were let. See Horton
v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E. 2d 311 (1967) where the Massachusetts court held
that a lease of a furnished cottage for nine months was not so long as to place the
risk of concealed defects on the lessee.
19Legere v. Asselta, 342 Mass. 178, 172 N.E. 2d 685 (1961); Bowman v. Realty
Operators Corp., 336 Mass. 395, 145 N.E. 2d 833 (1957); Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346,
148 N.E. 809 (1925).
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premises were fully furnished.2 The Massachusetts court then extended
the warranty to cover structural defects in the premises.21 The end
result of all of these decisions was to expand the scope of recovery,
while confining the factual setting giving rise to recovery.
A major problem left unanswered by the Massachusetts court is
whether the tenant's contributory negligence is a bar to his recovery.
It is to be remembered that the liability of the landlord at common law
was based on his negligence, either in his failure to disclose latent de-
fects which were known to him or in misrepresenting the condition of
the premises.2 Therefore, contributory negligence on the part of the
tenant was always a bar to recovery.23 Clearly, however, the common
law courts did not contemplate the situation involving an implied
warranty of habitability in a short term lease of furnished premises.
Whether the tenant's contributory negligence would be a defense for
the landlord today in an action for breach of implied warranty of
habitability, would depend on the nature of the warranty action. In
the majority of jurisdictions which consider breach of warranty as a
contract action, contributory negligence would not be a bar.2 4 This,
in effect, has the undesired result of making the landlord absolutely
liable for the tenant's injuries.
A number of reasons have been raised for not imposing absolute
liability on the landlord. For instance, the landlord could carefully
20 Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 348, 148 N.E. 809, 810 (1925). Consider the
difficulties that may arise with respect to determining when premises are only partially
furnished.
21 Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E. 2d 418 (1946). The case, in dictum,
suggests that the warranty protection would extend to cover members of the tenant's
household.22 See cases cited notes 1 and 2 supra.
23 A few cases went so far as to hold that the tenant's contributory negligence was
a defense for the landlord even where the landlord was guilty of fraud in concealing
defects. See Nelson v. Myers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 P. 719 (1928).
24 The slight weight of authority today in the field of products liability is that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense to a warranty action. See Simmons v. Wichita
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957); Brockett v. Harrell Bros.
Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965). Contra, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior
Burner Service Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alaska 1967); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 100
N.J. Super. 515, 242 A.2d 663 (1968); Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Langley,
422 S.W.2d 773 (Texas 1967). See also FRUMER & FmxnaE N, 1 PoDucrs LIAmLirY
§ 16.01[31; HuRsR, 1 AMERicAN LAW OF PRODucTs Lr nirrv, S 3.9; RESTATEMmNT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs 402A, comment n (1965). Cf. Hart v. Coleman, 192 Ala. 477, 68 So. 315 (1915)
(plea of contributory negligence by the landlord was "entirely inept" as a defense to
a count ex contractu for the landlord's breach of his contract to repair).
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inspect the premises and still find himself liable to a careless tenant.
Another reason for not imposing absolute liability on the landlord is
the unique relationship between landlord and tenant, which has its
historical roots in the common law.25 Although the incidents of pos-
session borne by the tenant are, for the most part, no longer viable,
something unique in the character of real estate militates against holding
the landlord to the same standard as a vendor of personal property. Since
a leasehold of furnished premises contains personalty as well as realty,
however, why should the landlord not be held to the same standard as
a lessor of personal property?
The Bailment Theory
It has been suggested that the lease of furnished premises for short
periods, especially in resort areas, might be considered as having a dual
aspect-that is, it is both a lease of realty and a contract of bailment of
the furnishings. 26 The common law caveat emptor rule would still be
applicable to the structural premises, but an implied warranty of fitness
for use would apply to the furnishings.2 7 Clearly, the owner of a chattel
who lets it out for hire has a duty to see that the chattel is reasonably
safe for its intended use.28 There is nothing in the law of landlord and
tenant to militate against this view, and cases such as Hacker v. Nitschke
could be decided on a similar rationale without the necessity of creat-
ing an uncertain exception to the common law rule.
More than likely, it is the apparent simplicity of the bailment theory
which has prevented courts from adopting it. On its face the theory
is not limited to furnishings leased with the dwelling, and, therefore,
could extend to personal property other than furnishings owned by the
25 Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482; 53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270-71 (1966). See
Harkrider, supra note 14, at 260-63.26Wilson v. Hatton, 2 Ex. 336 (1887) (opinion of Pollock, B); Sutton v. Temple,
152 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1112 (1843) (opinion of Lord Abinger, C.B.); Harkrider, supra note
14, at 283-85.
27 Harkrider, supra note 14, at 283. It has been suggested that where a landlord rents
a house warranting the safety and sufficiency of its ceiling, there is imposed on him
a duty to maintain it in that condition, and a failure to perform this duty can fix the
landlord's negligence which caused the injury. It is significant, however, that the court
would not allow the tenant's child, who was injured when the ceiling fell, to maintain
an action on the warranty. Moore v. Steljes, 69 F. 518 (2nd Cir. 1895).
2 8 See Albina Engine & Machine Works, Inc. v. Abel, 305 F. 2d 77 (10th Cir. 1962);
Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 515, 242 A.2d 663 (1969); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Rental & Leasing Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Lackey v.
Perry, 366 S.W. 2d 91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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landlord and left on the premises. Another major criticism of the bail-
ment theory is in its distinction between personalty and realty, which
can only raise all the potential problems inherent in the law of fixtures.
Furthermore, if the theory were extended to fixtures, the next step
would be to allow recovery for defects in the structural premises. As a
result, the courts treat the presence of furnishings only as evidence
tending to show that the premises were leased for immediate habitation.
Innkeeper-Guest
To date Massachusetts is the only state which clearly allows a tenant
to recover on the basis of a breach of an implied warranty of habit-
ability for injuries resulting from defects in furnished premises leased
for a short period. 29 In a few states, statutes impose a duty on the
landlord to put the premises in a tenantable condition." These statutes,
generally in the area of low income housing, recognize that the land-
lord is not only in a superior bargaining position, but is also in a better
position to protect against hazards in the premises.3' Apart from stat-
utes, those jurisdictions which allow the tenant to recover have done
so with modifications of the "implied warranty of furnished premises"
rule. In 1931, the District Court of Appeals of California followed
Massachusetts with respect to defects in furnishings.3 2 Later cases in
California, however, rejected the application of an implied warranty to
all furnishings, holding that such a broad application would make a
lessor of furnished premises a virtual insurer of his tenant.3
The California courts modified the implied warranty theory by re-
29 Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E. 2d 311 (1967); Legere v. Asselta, 342
Mass. 178, 172 N.E. 2d 685 (1961); Bowman v. Realty Operators Corp., 336 Mass. 399,
145 N.E. 2d 833 (1957); Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E. 2d 418 (1946).
Rhode Island rejected the exception, at least to the extent that it permits recovery in
tort. Zatloff v. Winkleman, 90 R.I. 403, 158 A. 2d 874 (1960) (The plaintiff-tenant
brought his action in tort and not in contract).
30 For a discussion and listing of statutes see Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1279, 1284-87 (1960); Note, 35 Lh. L.J. 361, 370-371 (1960).
31 See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519, 523-528 (1966).
32 Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P. 2d 518 (1931) (Query as to whether
this was not in fact a "fixture"). The court held that the landlord of a furnished apart-
ment impliedly warrants the safety of the premises and the furnishing to the same
extent as does an innkeeper.
33 Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 416, 282 P. 2d 890 (1955); Hunter
v. Freeman, 105 Cal. App. 2d 129, 233 P. 2d 65, 67 (1951); Forrester v. Hoover Hotel
& Investment Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 226, 196 P. 2d 825 (1948).
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sorting to the logic of innkeeper-guest law rather than to that of landlord-
tenant.34 Unlike a landlord, the innkeeper has an affirmative duty to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and to insure that
the furnishings will be safe if used in an ordinary and reasonable man-
ner.35 The innkeeper's liability is predicated on negligence, and he is
relieved of liability when the tenant's negligence contributes to his
injury.36 In view of the degree of control that a lessor retains over
furnished permises rented for short periods, his identity is more closely
associated with the innkeeper than with the common law landlord.37
Similarly, a tenant under a short term lease of furnished premises may
be compared to a guest, who has only the right to use the premises,
subject to the landlord's control and right of access to them. Clearly,
the typical lease of a furnished beach cottage more closely parallels
the renting of a hotel room than an unfurnished apartment. 8
Conclusion
Unquestionably, there is a need to revise the law of landlord and
tenant where furnished premises are leased for short periods. Since no
34Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 416, 282 P. 2d 890 (1955); For-
rester v. Hoover Hotel & Investment Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 226, 196 P. 2d 825 (1948).
35 Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 416, 282 P. 2d 890, 892 (1955); Lynch
v. Sprague, Inc., 95 N.H. 485, 66 A. 2d 697 (1949); Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp.,
182 Va. 713, 716, 30 S.E. 2d 673, 674 (1944); Kirby v. Moehlman, 182 Va. 876, 884, 30
S.E. 2d 548, 551 (1944). See VA. CODE ANN. § 35-10 (Repl. Vol. 1953). If the relation-
ship is that of an owner of a hotel and a guest, the rule is that, although the proprietor
is not absolutely liable for injuries suffered, he owes a duty, at all times, to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Stowe v. Fritzie, supra 282 P. 2d 892.
36 Bazure v. Richman, 169 Cal. App. 2d 218, 336 P. 2d 1014 (1959); Baxton v.
Deloatch, 84 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1956); Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 183 P. 2d
325 (1947); Griggs v. Cook, 106 Cal. App. 551, 289 P. 693 (1930); Nelson v. Myers, 94
Cal. App. 66, 270 P. 719 (1928).
37 A "tenant" has exclusive legal possession of the premises and is responsible for
their care and condition; on the other hand, a "guest" has only the right to use the
premises, subject to the landlord's retention of control and right to access to them.
Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890, 893 (1955). In Lynch v.
Sprague, Inc., 95 N.H. 485, 66 A.2d 697 (1949), a guest in a hotel was injured when a
ladder leading to the upper bunk of a bunk-bed slipped from the bed as she descended.
The court held the defendant (hotel) negligent in maintaining the ladder without
securing it to the bunk-bed in an adequate manner. Compare this result with that
reached in Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 NE. 2d 644 (1942).
38 Compare Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931) witb Stowe v.
Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. App. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955) and Chase v. Bard, 55
Wash.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1960).
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inspection of the premises is contemplated in a typical short term lease
of furnished premises, the tenant should not be shaekled with the harsh
implications of the antiquated caveat emptor rule. But neither should
the landlord be made an absolute insurer of the tenant's safety, par-
ticularly where he has exercised due care to see that the premises are in
a reasonably safe condition. Finding a proper balance between these
two extremes is made more difficult in view of the undesirable results
achieved by Hacker v. Nitschke and the artificial simplicity of the
bailment theory.
It is to be recommended that in a lease of furnished premises for a short
term, particularly with respect to resort lodgings where there is a
frequent change of tenants within a short period, the landlord should
be required to ifispect the premises before leasing them. The lessor's
duty in this situation would be to use reasonable care to see that the
premises are safe for use when the tenant takes possession. Only in this
manner can an effective compromise between absolute liability and caveat
emptor be reached.
W. S. F., Jr.
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